Increasing concern over corporate governance has led to calls for more shareholder in‡uence over corporate decisions, but allowing shareholders to vote on more issues, such as executive compensation, may not a¤ect the quality of governance. We should expect instead that, under current rules, shareholder voting will implement the preferences of the majority of large shareholders and management. This is because majority rule o¤ers little incentive for small shareholders to vote. I o¤er a potential remedy in the form of a new voting rule, the Idealized Electoral College (IEC), modeled on the American electoral college, that significantly increases the expected impact that a given shareholder has on election. The bene…t of the mechanism is that it induces greater turnout, but the cost is that it sometimes assigns a winner that is not preferred by a majority of voters. Therefore, for issues on which management and small shareholders are likely to agree, majority rule is a superior mechanism for shareholder voting. For issues on which they are likely to disagree, the IEC is superior.
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In order to improve corporate governance, academics and policy makers often suggest increasing the number of things upon which shareholders can vote. For example, a "say on pay" rule gives shareholders a binding or non-binding vote on CEO compensation. Governance experts hope these rules can rein in excessive pay packages but, with some notable exceptions, 1 early evidence seems to run contrary to these aspirations.
In Support for corporate management is still the status quo. "It turns out that (US)
shareholders may be more accepting of how things work than the perception really is,"
said Charles Elson, director of the Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance at the University of Delaware. 2 In 2012:
Except in fairly extraordinary circumstances, [shareholders] don't much care about how much people get paid...We saw it last year, the …rst year say-on-pay votes were required by the new Dodd-Frank …nancial reform law, and we're seeing it again this year.
Last year, only 36 of 2,225 companies said shareholders voted down their compensation plans. 3 Are shareholders really accepting of these pay packages? I show below that, under majority rule, we should expect that small shareholders will abstain from voting: majority rule will implement the will of the majority of large shareholders, not the majority of all shareholders. Many large 1 Smith, 1988, 1994) . Moreover, management itself is often a large shareholder. Because small shareholders are inclined to abstain, majority rule will implement the will of management, not shareholders. This is especially true when, as is the case in the United States, brokers are allowed to vote the shares of their clients if the clients do not submit votes. 4 In attempting to improve corporate governance, therefore, we must either abandon the shareholder voting route, or we must reconsider the use of the majority rule mechanism. I o¤er in this paper an alternative mechanism, the Idealized Electoral College (IEC), that may induce small shareholders to vote. The bene…t of the IEC is that it signi…cantly increases the likelihood that a given voter will a¤ect the outcome of the election, relative to majority rule, thus increasing turnout.
The cost of the IEC is that the side receiving fewer votes sometimes wins the election. This means that even if all shares are voted, the majority's will may not be implemented. Therefore, the IEC is superior to majority rule if and only if the preferences of large shareholders/management di¤er from those of shareholders overall.
The IEC mechanism is a randomized and stylized version of the American Electoral College, in which votes for or against a proposal are organized into groups, and majority rule determines each group's choice. Groups are formed into super-groups and majority rule is again applied. This process is repeated until all votes are aggregated to a single decision. I show that individual votes are almost always far more likely to a¤ect the outcome of an election under the IEC mechanism than under majority rule. 5 I then introduce a model of shareholder preferences and voting, and derive properties of two important equilibria, one in which all shareholders vote (a "universal voting" equilibrium), and one in which only large shareholders vote (a "universal abstention" equilibrium). If parameters are such that a universal voting equilibrium exists for majority rule, then one exists for the IEC as well. The converse, however, is not true. There are cases in which the IEC induces all voters to vote, but majority rule does not. Moreover, of the set of parameter values such that the IEC allows a universal voting equilibrium, the fraction for which majority rule also induces universal voting goes to zero as the number of votes goes to in…nity.
Universal abstention equilibria are much more likely to exist under majority rule. Indeed, I
would argue that these equilibria are the norm in practice. Burch, Morgan and Wolf (2004) …nd that, in votes at acquiring …rms concerning large stock-for-stock mergers-those mergers in which value is most likely to be destroyed-the fraction of shares voted in favor is 95%-98%. They do not …nd a single failed vote in their sample, spanning 1990-2000. Nearly all shareholders who vote side with management, which is peculiar because the sample speci…cally contains only proposals that are likely to harm shareholders. It seems that shareholders lacking a private bene…t to siding with management are simply abstaining. As I show, under majority rule this is to be expected; under the IEC it is less likely.
I also analyze what conditions of an electorate make the IEC or majority rule superior. Majority rule is superior when large and small shareholders have similar preferences, but the IEC is superior when they have signi…cantly di¤erent preferences. There is therefore reason to believe that the IEC could be selectively implemented for certain types of votes, such as those regarding executive pay.
There are alternative mechanisms that have been developed that could assign special power to small or minority shareholders. For example, dual class voting, introduced in Maug and Yilmaz 5 I often call a voter more "powerful" in this paper if her vote, on average, has a higher expected impact on the outcome of an election. This de…nition does not refer to the power of voters, in general, vis-a-vis management.
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, could be applied to the problem in several ways, two of which I discuss. Either classes could be de…ned by the ownership stake of the voter, with small shareholders (e.g. < 3%) constituting one class and large shareholders (e.g. > 3%) and management constituting another, or classes could be de…ned by connection to management, where shareholders with a business relationship with the …rm constitute one class and shareholders with no business relationship constitute another.
In either case, majority rule would determine each class's choice, and each class would have veto power over a proposal. One could reasonably ask why the IEC is useful when these alternatives exist.
The IEC mechanism is inferior to these alternatives under the assumption that the class assignment is not manipulable, but manipulation may be feasible in practice. As one example, large shareholders can mimic small shareholders by splitting stakes among shell funds or corporations, each of which has a small ownership stake. 6 For another example, …rms with a business relationship could legally split the investment side of the business from the pension management side.
Regardless of the details, any rule where voting rights depend upon characteristics of the voter may be subject to manipulation. The IEC is not subject to manipulation because each share has the same rights, regardless of its ownership. In a …nance setting, where voting identities can be masked, faked or otherwise manipulated, an anonymous rule is important.
There are three lines of literature relevant for this research, the …rst concerning voting rules in corporate governance, the second concerning the e¤ect of voting costs on the e¢ cacy of a voting mechanism, and the third concerning the electoral college.
First, there has been periodic discussion in the corporate governance literature concerning optimal voting rules for corporations. Harris and Raviv (1988) and Grossman and Hart (1988) provide arguments in favor of the standard one share-one vote/majority rule policy in place at most companies. Maug and Yilmaz (2002) , on the other hand, show that it can be optimal to have separate classes of voter, with a majority rule mechanism operating within each class. While they focus on the ability of a mechanism to aggregate private information, which may not be fully revealed if the interests of di¤erent classes of voter are su¢ ciently di¤erent, I focus on the ability of the mechanism to aggregate preferences, which voters may not know or express if the likelihood of a¤ecting the outcome of an election is too low relative to the cost of voting.
Second, in much of the voting literature, the cost of voting is zero, so voters do not abstain.
Because I focus on the inability of majority rule to induce small shareholders to vote, the problem of abstention is critical to this paper. The costly voting literature began with Downs (1957) and Tullock (1968) , who noted that voting appears to be irrational: because voters have a vanishingly low likelihood of a¤ecting the outcome, even a minor cost associated with voting should induce much lower turnouts than we see in practice. Following this observation, political scientists, beginning with Riker and Ordeshook (1968), developed explanations in the so-called "calculus of voting"literature.
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A more recent line of research integrates costly and strategic voting. Borgers (2004) shows that voluntary participation can lead to excessive turnout because voters do not take into account the negative externality of their vote on others-namely, that their vote reduces the expected impact of others'votes. Krasa and Polborn (2009) show that turnout may also be less than optimal, so the impact of voting costs on the number of voters is model-speci…c.
By adding heterogeneity in voting costs, Taylor and Yildirim (2010) show that as elections become large, the voting population becomes exclusively composed of the lowest cost voters. Interestingly, this point was also made by Hegel in 1821: 9 As for popular su¤rage, it may be further remarked that especially in large states it leads inevitably to electoral indi¤erence, since the casting of a single vote is of no 7 Riker and Ordeshook (1968) formalize voter preferences and assume a positive reward from the act of voting, R, and a positive cost to voting, C. If R C, then even if the likelihood of a¤ecting the outcome is zero, then voters will vote. 8 Amartya Sen also discusses the calculus of voting in his 1970 work, Collective Choice and Social Welfare. 9 Hegel's discussion of costly voting was pointed out in Buchanan (1974 Third, the IEC mechanism is a stylized version of the American electoral college, in which voters are arranged into tiers and votes are aggregated at each tier. 10 While this particular mechanism is new, there has been some work done in the political economy literature to highlight bene…ts of the existing American Electoral College. Natapo¤ (1996) , for example, shows that a combination of careful districting and assigning weights to districts based on vote count (rather than population)
can increase voter power beyond standard majority voting. This literature, however, has not analyzed randomized or more tiered versions of the electoral college like the one outlined in this paper.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 1 describes the IEC mechanism and provides some simple comparisons to majority rule. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 shows conditions under which universal abstention and universal voting equilibria are present under each mechanism. Section 4 analyzes what conditions of an electorate make the IEC or majority rule superior. Section 5 provides some numerical analysis suggesting that voter power 10 In the electoral college system, voters vote for a presidential candidate, and those votes are aggregated at the state level. If a majority of voters in, say, Ohio vote for candidate A, then all of the votes in Ohio are voted in favor of A. The di¤erences between the actual electoral college and the IEC are that (a) voters are assigned to groups based on geographic location in the former case, and randomly in the latter, (b) groups are of di¤erent sizes in the former case and are equally sized in the latter, and (c) there are two tiers in the former case and more than two in the latter.
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increases monotonically as we incrementally adjust the mechanism from majority rule to the IEC. 
The Idealized Electoral College voting mechanism
The idealized electoral college voting mechanism arranges votes into tiers and uses results from each tier as votes for the next tier. To be precise, consider an election where a vote is either for or against a proposal (there are only two choices). The IEC mechanism randomly collects all votes into groups/sets of size , being an odd integer greater than one. Assume that the number of votes cast is N = z where z is a positive integer greater than or equal to one. Within each set, the votes for each choice are added, and the choice with a greater number of votes is declared the choice for that set.
These sets are then randomly arranged into super-sets comprised of sets each, and the "votes" of each original set are aggregated to get a "vote" for the super-set. Super-sets are arranged into super-super-sets etc. This is repeated until a choice is made. Figure 1 o¤ers an example of a two-tier 3-pyramid: = 3, z = 2, so the number of voters equals z = 3 2 = 9. In the example, there are six votes for A and three for B. These votes are randomly distributed into three sets of three votes each. In the example shown in Figure 1 the …rst set features two votes for A and one for B. The …rst set therefore "votes" for A. Similarly, the second "votes" for A and the third "votes"for B. These three sets are then arranged into a super-set. In this super-set two votes are for A and one for B so the super-set "votes"for A. Because this super-set contains all votes, A is the winner of this election.
can be any odd number between 3 and N , inclusive. At one extreme, equals the number of votes N , and z = 1: the number of tiers is minimized and the number of votes per tier is maximized. This extreme is also known as majority rule. At the other extreme, where = 3 and z = log 3 N , the number of tiers is maximized and the number of votes per tier is minimized. In this paper I focus on a comparison of these two extreme cases, and in Section 5 show that results appear to be monotonic in between these two extremes. Unless otherwise noted, the term "IEC"
is henceforth used to refer to the case where = 3.
A simple example of voter power under the IEC
Let the number of votes be N = 3 z where z is an integer greater than or equal to two. 11 De…ne tier i to be the i th tier from the bottom. Tier 0 has N members, tier 1 has N/3 members, etc., so tier z has only one member. Consider a choice between two options, A and B. Let each voter be independently in favor of A with probability t 0 2 (0; 1) and in favor of B with probability 1 t 0 .
A group chooses A if either two or three votes within the group are in favor of A. This occurs with probability
That is, the probability that a group in tier 1 "votes"for A is t 1 . This same calculation can be made for each tier: the probability that a group in tier i chooses A is the probability that either two or three of its sub-groups in tier i 1 "vote"for A. Therefore, probability of being pivotal than does majority rule. Figure 1 highlights how this can be true: the two left-most votes are both pivotal, in that if either had voted for B, then B would have won the election. This is in spite of the fact that, under majority rule, no vote would be pivotal. The IEC mechanism o¤ers some opportunity for votes to a¤ect elections even if the numbers of votes for each side are not very close.
While Lemma 1 is a limiting statement, the number of votes need not be particularly large for the IEC mechanism to o¤er much more power than majority rule. Figure 2 displays the ratio of the probability that a given vote is pivotal under the IEC mechanism to the probability that it is pivotal under majority rule, for a variety of population sizes and values of t 0 . As is immediately clear, except for the knife-edge case of t 0 = 1 2
, the IEC mechanism o¤ers far more power even for small numbers of votes. For example, if there are 729 votes and the expected probability of any given vote going for A is 35%, then a vote is 60 billion times more likely to be pivotal under the IEC mechanism than under the majority rule mechanism. Even in close elections, the IEC rule gives votes far more power: if there are roughly 60,0000 shareholders, each holding one share, and the probability of any given shareholder voting for A is 49%-a very close election and a very small corporation-then the probability of any given shareholder being pivotal is approximately 14,035 times as high under the IEC mechanism as under the majority rule mechanism. Figure 2 : as the contest is increasingly expected to be close (i.e., t 0 ! 1 2 from either direction), the relative power of the IEC mechanism decreases. That said, even for very close elections, the power a¤orded votes by the IEC is much greater than that a¤orded by majority rule.
Lemma 2 establishes analytically what is clear in
It is worth a brief discussion of why t 0 = 1=2 is special. Holding constant the probability that A wins an election, the probability that a given vote is pivotal is slightly higher under the majority rule mechanism. On the other hand, the probability that A wins the election decreases very fast as N increases for majority rule relative to the IEC mechanism. The second e¤ect quickly overrides the …rst, so the IEC mechanism o¤ers more power as the number of votes increases. When t 0 = 1=2, the probability of A winning the election is 1/2 regardless of N for both the IEC and majority rule mechanisms, so the slight power advantage o¤ered by majority rule is always present.
The Model
Voting entails a cost including, at least, the time to …ll out a ballot and the price of a stamp. If a voter is interested in making an informed decision, then this cost also includes time and e¤ort to understand the issues. Voting also entails a bene…t, insofar as the outcome of an election is more likely to go in one's favor if one votes. Large shareholders therefore have a greater bene…t from voting, but probably a similar or lesser cost, and are therefore more inclined to vote.
I model voters as di¤ering in their cost of voting and in their preference for a proposed policy.
I therefore abstract away from issues of information acquisition and, therefore, strategic voting, in setting up the model. While this is very useful in simplifying the analysis, it is also useful in highlighting the point that even when shareholders know that management is advancing proposals against their interest, allowing them to vote on such proposals does not necessarily solve the governance problem. The model can also be interpreted as one in which the cost of voting is zero for all voters, but some voters know their preferences and some must pay a cost to learn them perfectly. If prior beliefs are such that voters that do not pay the cost would prefer not to vote, then all results from this model would be identical.
The voters
Let there be a vote on a proposal and let the voters be divided along two dimensions. Some prefer that the vote succeed (S) and some that it fail (F ). Some have a voting cost equal to C > 0 and some have a voting cost equal to 0. A voter's type will therefore be one of the following four:
SC; S0; F C or F 0. It will sometimes be convenient to refer to type S0 and SC voters collectively as type S, and type F 0 and F C voters as type F . Similarly, it will sometimes be convenient to refer to type S0 and F 0 voters collectively as type 0 and type SC and F C voters as type C.
The number of voters in each group is denoted N ix , where i 2 fS; F g represents whether the voters prefer success or failure, and x 2 f0; Cg represents the voting cost. For ease of exposition, I will sometimes aggregate the number of voters along either or both dimensions, in which case we will have only one or zero subscripts on N , respectively. Then N S N SC + N S0 people prefer that the vote succeed and
have voting cost of 0 and N C N SC + N F C have voting cost C. The total number of voters is
Voters can vote yes, no or abstain. Each voter's utility is given by U = V I xJ=2. I takes a value of one if the outcome of the vote is consistent with the voter's preferences and zero otherwise,
J takes a value of one if she votes and zero otherwise, and x 2 f0; Cg is the voter's voting cost.
The voting game
The voting game has three parts. First, nature chooses a distribution of voter types which is not observed by voters. Next, voters choose whether to abstain, vote in favor, or vote against the proposal. Finally, the voting mechanism assigns a winner based, perhaps randomly, on those votes. I now describe each step in more detail.
For each of N voters, nature assigns the voter to be type ix 2 fS0; F 0; SC; F Cg with probability p ix , where P i2fS;F g;x2f0;Cg p ix = 1. Draws are independent. The vector of the number of voters of each type, ! N = fN S0 ; N SC ; N F 0 ; N F C g; is therefore a random variable. The number of voters N , and the probability that each voter is assigned to each type,
knowledge, but the actual draw ! N is not observed.
Note that in practice, shareholders own di¤erent numbers of shares, and the preferences of large shareholders (e.g., management) may be known. The former implies that preferences of each "voter" (where a voter is a share) are not independent. The latter implies that, for some voters, type is not a random, unobserved draw. I abstract from these issues in the name of analytical tractability but, in stating Propositions 3 and 4, I will change these assumptions so that large shareholders'stakes and preferences are known, and only small shareholders'preferences are independent, random and unknown.
I make the following assumption in order to be able to solve for properties of the IEC analytically. We will be particularly interested in the e¤ect that an arbitrary voter has on an election. In classic voting theory, without abstentions, this is the probability of a voter being pivotal, interacted with the choice that the voter makes. In majority rule with an odd number of voters, for example, the probability that a given voter is pivotal is the probability that, without her vote, there is a tie.
In a random dictator election, in which all votes are put in a proverbial hat and one is selected at random, she is pivotal if her vote is picked. The change in the probability of victory for her preferred side if she votes in favor versus against equals the probability of a tie, under majority rule, or 1=N in a random dictator election.
If abstention is permitted, however, we must put the question somewhat di¤erently. As I show in Lemma 3 below, voters never vote against their types: the choice is to vote one's type or else abstain. When the voter decides whether to vote, the relevant parameter is the di¤erence in the likelihood that her preferred choice wins if she votes versus if she does not vote. We de…ne this di¤erence as the expected e¤ect of a vote.
14 Let f S and f F be the distributions of T S and T F , respectively, given voter strategies.
De…nition 1
The expected e¤ect i (f S ; f F ) that a voter of type i 2 fS; F g has on an election equals the change in the probability that her preferred choice wins if she votes her type rather than
De…nition 2 A voting rule is monotonic if 0.
Any standard voting rule is monotonic, including majority rule and the IEC. Voting in line with your preferences cannot hurt your cause.
Equilibrium
An equilibrium in the voting game is (potentially randomized) choices for each of N players of whether to vote yes or no, or abstain, such that, given accurate beliefs about the (potentially randomized) choices of other players, each player is maximizing her utility. I restrict attention to symmetric equilibria:
De…nition 3 An equilibrium is symmetric if all voters of the same type play the same randomization probabilities q j ix 2 [0; 1]; i 2 fS; F g,x 2 f0; Cg; j 2 fS; F; Ag.
The subscript refers to the type of the player and the superscript refers to the choice of voting for success or failure, or abstaining. Because the probabilities for a given type must sum to unity, the probability of abstaining for type ix is q
Assumption 2: Players do not play weakly dominated strategies.
This assumption reduces the set of potential equilibria by excluding cases where the vote is deterministic ( = 0 or 1, given voter behavior) but type 0 voters may be playing a variety of strategies. These equilibria certainly are not unreasonable in a literal sense, but they add little to the discussion at hand while adding many special cases to the proofs. 15 Given that it is common to exclude the play of weakly dominated strategies on the grounds of "reasonableness", I make the exclusion here.
This immediately yields the following result:
Lemma 3 In an election with a monotonic voting rule:
(a) Voters never vote against their types.
(b) Type 0 voters always vote in favor of their types, i.e., do not abstain.
Proof. If the voting rule is monotonic, the probability of a type's preferred choice winning if she votes for that choice is weakly greater than if she votes against. Because the cost of voting is equal either way, part (a) of Lemma (3) follows immediately. Now restrict attention to type 0 voters. Voting in favor yields expected utility E(U ) = V ( + S ) and abstaining yields utility 15 The most interesting equilibria that result when we remove this assumption are those where one type of type 0 voter abstains (or votes against her preferences) and the other votes in accordance with her preferences. In this case, the will of the type voting in accordance with its preferences is implemented. This is true even if the number of type zero voters in this group is smaller than in the group abstaining/voting against its preferences. We therefore exclude with this assumption one interesting equilibrium where a potentially very small group of voters imposes its will. The plausibility of this equilibrium is open for debate. and a universal abstention equilibrium exists only under majority rule. We will also see that mixed-strategy equilibria are not stable, so universal voting and universal abstention are the only plausible equilibria.
The existence of universal voting equilibria
A universal voting equilibrium, in which all voters vote, can only obtain if the voters with a positive cost of voting …nd that the expected e¤ect of a vote is greater than or equal to C=V .
Under majority rule, if voter v believes that all other voters will vote, then the expected e¤ect equals the probability of a tie, had she not voted, multiplied by 1/2, since her vote replaces a coin ‡ip.
Note that this is the same value for all types of voter, regardless of ! p . As previously shown in Equations (1) and (2), the expected e¤ect of a voter of type j 2 fS; F g under the IEC rule equals
the maximum value of C such that a universal voting equilibrium exists for voting rule k. Then
We then have our primary result:
Proposition 1 Universal voting equilibria exist for majority rule and the IEC so long as 0 < C C maj in the former case and 0 < C C IEC in the latter. C maj and C IEC have the following properties:
To state these results in words, there always exist universal voting equilibria so long as voting costs are su¢ ciently low. The important question here is, how low? When the number of votes is large, voting costs must be very low in order for a universal voting equilibrium to exist, and in fact must approach zero as the number of votes grows to in…nity. The set of values of C such that a universal voting equilibrium exists is [0; C k ], and the size of this set depends upon the voting rule.
The ratio of the sizes of these sets under the IEC versus majority rule is given by C IEC =C maj and Proposition 1 establishes that this goes to in…nity as the number of voters grows. One becomes 16 Recall that N is known and odd.
much "more likely" to …nd a universal voting equilibrium under the IEC than majority rule for large elections. 
The existence of universal abstention equilibria
A universal abstention equilibrium obtains if, given that no other high cost voters are expected to vote, it is not in the interest of a single high cost voter to vote. This will occur for any voting rule where p S0 and p F 0 are su¢ ciently di¤erent and C=V is su¢ ciently high. As with our results concerning universal voting equilibria, because the IEC gives individual voters so much more power to a¤ect the outcome of an election, they will be willing to vote even when p S0 and p F 0 are more di¤erent and when C=V is higher. Let C k be the lower bound on C for mechanism k such that a universal abstention equilibrium exists.
Proposition 2 There exists a value C maj (N; p S0 ; p F 0 ) > 0 such that a universal abstention equilibrium exists for majority rule i¤ C C maj (N; p S0 ; p F 0 ): C maj is decreasing in jp S0 p F 0 j and N , and lim N !1 C maj = 0:
I cannot show analytical results concerning the existence of universal abstention equilibria for the IEC because N 0 is a random variable that does not generally equal an integer power of three.
It seems likely that the power of the IEC relative to majority rule, shown for the case of N = 3 z , applies more generally.
However, two changes in our assumptions about nature's initial assignment of preferences yield analytical results. We have so far assumed, e¤ectively, that each shareholder controls one share and that her preferences are unknown. Instead, it may be reasonable to assume that there are both large and small shareholders, and that the preferences of large shareholders are observable.
In this case, N S0 and N F 0 would be …xed and known. For the remaining propositions, we make the following assumption: Just as the IEC supports universal voting equilibria by increasing the expected e¤ect of a vote, the IEC also prevents universal abstention equilibria. The bound on voting costs C, below which a universal abstention equilibrium does not exist, is higher for the IEC than majority rule. This means that, given voting costs, the IEC often will not permit a universal abstention equilibrium while majority rule will.
The ratio of these bounds goes to in…nity as the number of voters goes to in…nity:
The existence of mixed strategy equilibria
Mixed strategy equilibria, in which one or both types of voter randomize whether to vote or abstain with a probability strictly between zero and one, are not typically stable. The intuition can be seen in Figure 3 . This …gure displays the set of potential equilibria in the E(T S ); E(T F ) space.
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The curves represent the set of points where = C=V , with the assumption that is the same for each type of voter for the sake of clarity.
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For a standard voting rule, is increasing as E(T F ) approaches the 45 line from the left or E(T S ) approaches the 45 line from below. This is because closer elections make each vote have a larger expected e¤ect on the outcome of the election. 19 Therefore, between these curves, > C=V , so all voters strictly prefer to vote. Outside the curves, < C=V so all voters strictly prefer to abstain.
A proposed equilibrium is a point fE(T S ); E(T F )g, where E(
Because all type 0 voters vote their types, and the randomization probability for a type C voter, q iC , must lie between zero and one, E(N i0 ) E(T i ) E(N i ); i 2 fS; F g. For a point to be an equilibrium, then either both types are playing pure strategies, or the point is on the curves representing = C=V . 20 To see why mixed strategy equilibria are unstable, consider a potential equilibrium in highlighted section E. In this section, both types are playing mixed strategies. Suppose one type S voter chooses to randomize with a higher probability of voting. Then E(T S ) increases and S increases. This means that > C=V for type S voters, so all would strictly prefer to vote, rather than to randomize. Similarly, if one type S voter were decrease her probability of voting, then < C=V and type S voters would strictly prefer to abstain. Therefore, points in section E are not stable equilibria. A similar argument follows for type F voters and section F. 18 Drawing curves for both type S and F voters would muddle the …gure without providing signi…cant additional intuition. 19 We can see this for both majority rule and the IEC. Under majority rule, if the number of votes is odd, a vote only a¤ects the outcome of an election if the other voters split their votes. Therefore, as the expected number of votes for each side is more similar, the expected e¤ect of a vote is greater. The same goes for the IEC. As the expected number of votes for each side is closer, it is more likely that a voter will …nd herself in a group with a split vote. It is also more likely that that group will …nd itself in a super-group with a split vote, etc. Therefore, as the vote is expected to be closer, the expected e¤ect of a vote is greater. This principle is true for most voting rules. 20 Note that if there are many type 0 voters, then certain sections of these curves are infeasible because type 0 voters always vote (Lemma 3). For example, if E(N F 0 ) = E(N 
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The arrows in Figure 3 show the direction in which there is "pressure"to change voting probabilities. When a proposed equilibrium lies within the curves, > C=V , so voters would like to increase their likelihood of voting. When a proposed equilibrium lies outside the curves, < C=V , so voters would like to decrease their likelihood of voting. On the boundary where = C=V , the equilibrium is stable with respect to changes in behavior by the type of voter for which the arrows point at each other. The equilibrium is unstable with respect to changes in behavior by the type of voter for which the arrows point away from each other. There always exists one of type for whom the latter case holds, so mixed strategy equilibria are always unstable.
Voting rules and the will of the majority
Taken together, these results imply that which mechanism is more e¤ective at implementing the majority's will is a question of voting costs, and of whether the zero cost voters generally share the preferences of voters overall. When the voting cost C is low, or elections are very small, both majority rule and the IEC feature universal voting equilibria. In this case, majority rule is slightly better than the IEC. For intermediate values of C, the IEC is considerably better, as it implements a universal voting equilibrium while majority rule implements a universal abstention equilibrium.
When C is high, both majority rule and the IEC implement universal abstention equilibria, so neither is particularly good at implementing the majority's will.
In this section, I use …gures to evaluate when the IEC is useful, and precisely how it achieves its goals. First, I display properties of proposed equilibria in the fE(T S ); E(T F )g space, and show graphically why proposed pure strategy equilibria will or will not exist. Second, I graph, for each mechanism, which equilibrium exists as we increase C=V . This …gure highlights that, when the majority and minority disagree, the IEC is usually better, and often much better, than majority rule in implementing the will of the majority. Third, I show in the fE(N S0 =N F 0 ); E(N S =N F )g space what types of equilibrium will exist for majority rule and the IEC. The …gure highlights 22 that E(N S =N F ) determines whether a universal voting equilibrium exists, E(N S0 =N F 0 ) determines whether a universal abstention equilibrium exists, and E(N S0 =N F 0 )=E(N S =N F ) determines whether the minority's and majority's preferences coincide.
Why the IEC better supports universal voting equilibria and eliminates universal abstention equilibria
As discussed in Section 3.3, Figure 3 displays the properties of potential equilibria graphically.
When a proposed equilibrium lies between the curves representing = C=V , voters of both types S and F would strictly prefer to vote rather than abstain. When a proposed equilibrium lies outside these curves, both types of voter would strictly prefer to abstain.
We can use Figure 3 abstention is an equilibrium and more such that universal voting is an equilibrium. We see this in Figure 4 , which plots curves for = C=V for both voting mechanisms, holding constant ! p .
Point A is a potential universal abstention equilibrium and point B is a potential universal voting equilibrium. Because points A and B are outside the curves representing = C=V for majority rule, voters wish to abstain. This means that point B is not an equilibrium and point A is an equilibrium. Because points A and B are inside the curves representing = C=V for the IEC mechanism, voters wish to vote. This means that point B is an equilibrium and point A is not an equilibrium. In this …gure, then, the IEC permits only universal voting as an equilibrium, while majority rule permits only universal abstention. It is also possible for point(s) A and/or B to lie outside or inside both sets of curves, in which case the types of equilibria are the same under both mechanisms, but it is almost never the case that a universal voting equilibrium obtains for majority rule and not the IEC. This case, in fact, requires p S =p F 1, in which case there is no majority will to implement, in expectation.
Finally, note that as C=V decreases, the curves representing = C=V (for the IEC mechanism)
shift outward. This means that, for su¢ ciently low costs of voting, or su¢ ciently high values from implementing a preferred outcome, universal voting is an equilibrium and universal abstention is not. I evaluate the e¤ect of the cost of voting in the next section. Beginning with the left panel, in section A, when C=V < C maj , both majority rule and the IEC feature unique universal voting equilibria. Because the IEC sometimes assigns as winner the side receiving fewer votes, majority rule is slightly better than the IEC at implementing the majority's will. In section B, where C maj < C=V < C maj , majority rule features both universal voting and universal abstention equilibria. Without an equilibrium selection rule, we cannot say whether majority rule or the IEC is superior, but because the IEC almost always selects the winner according to the majority's preferences, and majority rule may induce universal abstention, we can say that the IEC is at least a safer bet. In section C, where C maj < C=V < C IEC , the IEC is clearly better, as it induces universal voting rather than universal abstention. In section D, where C IEC < C=V < C IEC , the IEC supports both universal voting and universal abstention equilibria.
The cost/bene…t of the IEC versus majority rule as a function of the voting cost
Either one, however, is better than the unique universal abstention equilibrium associated with majority rule, which is assured to make the choice less preferred by the majority. In section E, where C IEC < C=V , the IEC is slightly better because it chooses the majority-preferred choice at least sometimes.
In the right panel, the di¤erence is that, rather than each mechanism sometimes supporting both types of equilibrium, each sometimes supports no stable equilibrium. Sections A, C, and E have identical properties as in the left hand panel. In section B, where C maj < C=V < C maj , majority rule does not allow a stable equilibrium. As the IEC almost always implements the will of the majority, it is clearly superior. In section D, where C IEC < C=V < C IEC , the IEC does not allow a stable equilibrium. However, as majority rule certainly does not implement the majority's will for these values of C=V , any outcome induced by the IEC must be weakly better.
Taken together, we see that if the preferences of type 0 voters are counter to the preferences of voters overall, the IEC is superior to majority rule in implementing the majority's will for many values of voting costs C=V . Even if voting costs are low, and majority rule is better than the IEC, it is only slightly better. If type 0 voters share the preferences of the overall population, however, majority rule would be superior, as it always implements the majority's will with probability one. Figure 6 shows whether one or both types of equilibrium exist for each mechanism, as we vary the expected ratio of voters preferring S to F: In each panel, N and C=V are …xed. Spaces labeled "A" support only universal abstention equilibria: the vote share of type 0 voters is expected to be so lopsided that it is not worthwhile for any type C voter to vote. Spaces labeled "B"support only universal voting equilibria: the vote is expected to be close enough if everybody votes that it is worth it for each voter to vote. Spaces labeled "C"support both types of equilibrium: while the vote is expected to be close enough if everybody votes that it is worth it for each voter to vote, the vote is also expected to be so lopsided if only type 0 voters vote that, if type C voters expect that to occur, they will not vote. Spaces labeled "D"do not support stable equilibria: the vote is close enough if only type 0 voters vote that type C voters will prefer to vote. However, if all of them do so, then the vote is lopsided enough that it is no longer worth them voting. Note that area B is larger for the IEC and area A is larger for majority rule. In fact, the ratio of these sizes may be millions or billions to one.
The existence of equilibria versus disagreement among voters
As C=V or N rise, area B would shrink in each …gure, with the left-and right-most borders approaching the center. Area B would be eliminated for the IEC before majority rule because majority rule o¤ers voters slightly more power if p S p F . Areas labeled A would grow, with their borders approaching the center line where E(N S0 =N F 0 ) = 1.
The …rst and third quadrants (top right and bottom left) represent situations where type 0 voters and the overall population prefer the same choice, and the second and fourth quadrants represent situations there type 0 voters and the overall population disagree. As should be immediately clear, whether type 0 voters and the overall population agree is unrelated to the conditions 26 allowing each type of equilibrium.
The power of the IEC for alternative values of
We have seen that the IEC mechanism yields a much greater probability that an individual voter is pivotal than standard majority voting in the case where three elements are assigned to each set ( = 3), so long as there are many voters. In fact, reducing apparently increases pivotality monotonically, though there are two di¢ culties in showing this analytically. First, analytical results are intractable unless the number of voters N is a power of , so when we compare the probability of being pivotal with tiers of size to tiers of size 0 , there is not generally a value of N that is a power of both. In fact, analytical solutions are only available if and 'share a common divisor.
For example, = 3 and = 9 can be compared since they share the divisor of 3, 21 while = 3 and = 5 could not be compared since no power of three is also a power of …ve. This limits the set of comparisons we can make. Second, even when such comparisons are possible, the formulae for the probability of being pivotal become un-workably complex.
I maintain the de…nitions of tiers, etc., but add superscripts that identify the number of elements in a tier for the mechanism in question. The probability that a vote in tier i goes in favor, p i , equals the probability that a majority of voters in tier i 1 vote in favor, yielding
Let the probability of being pivotal in tier i be represented i . The probability of a voter being pivotal in tier i equals the probability that this voter is pivotal in tier i 1 multiplied by the probability that the other two groups in tier i split their votes. This equals:
for all integers i > 0.
1 is de…ned to equal 1. We then have
I wish to show that as gets larger, holding N constant, the probability of being pivotal at the highest tier is decreasing. Since the de…nition of p i is recursive, proving properties of z is di¢ cult for > 3. Though analytical solutions are unavailable, I present two sets of results that strongly suggest that is monotonically decreasing in .
First, I compare the probability of being pivotal when = 3 to the probability of being pivotal when = 9 for numbers of voters that are powers of 9. I display this ratio in Figure 8 . The ratio of the former to the latter clearly possesses the same qualitative properties as the ratio of the = 3 case to the majority rule case presented in Figure 2 . So long as the fraction of votes for A is not, in expectation, exactly 50%, the relative probability of being pivotal when = 3 versus = 9 goes to in…nity as the number of voters increases. While I prove this analytically only when comparing the case of = 3 to majority rule, the charts look strikingly similar. Similar comparisons for = 5
vs. = 25 look qualitatively identical.
Second, I calculate the probability a vote of being pivotal for = 3, = 5, = 7 and = 9 for a variety of values of N. For each value of I choose values of N that are successive powers of , so the N s associated with each are di¤erent. It can be di¢ cult to see trends in data presented this way so I plot these points in a scatter shown in Figure 9 . Points within each series are connected to highlight more clearly which points are associated with which values of . Note that the curves connecting these points are merely visual aids and are not numerically estimated. As should be quite clear, so long as the number of voters is su¢ ciently large, larger tiers result in lower probabilities of a voter being pivotal.
Application to shareholder elections
Applying these results to the shareholder voting setting, we take type 0 voters to be management and institutions, and type C voters to be small/individual shareholders. In fact, institutions may have a small positive cost of voting, no cost, or even a negative cost (stemming from private bene…ts of siding with management). We set their cost to zero for simplicity. Small voters have heterogeneous costs: larger holdings would be associated with a smaller per-share voting cost, and shareholders that closely follow corporate events may have a smaller cost of becoming informed.
For simplicity, we take all small shareholders to be type C, and assume all hold one share. I also assume no vote trading. Each of these simpli…cations is clearly an abstraction from reality, but they are necessary to derive analytical results.
Universal voting implies that all shareholders, large and small, vote their preferences. Suppose that institutions will always vote with management. If management o¤ers a proposal that is clearly bad for shareholders, then we have N F 0 = N SC = 0 : all type 0 shareholders would be in favor and all type C shareholders would be against. If N C > N 0 , then in a universal voting equilibrium, the proposal would fail with certainty, under majority rule, and with near certainty under the IEC.
In a universal abstention equilibrium, the proposal would succeed with certainty, under majority rule, and near certainty under the IEC. Under this assumption, then, the …rst order e¤ect of a voting rule is whether it supports either type of equilibrium. As was shown in Proposition 1, neither majority rule nor the IEC support universal voting equilibria when the number of voters goes to in…nity. However, for …nite numbers of voters, both support universal voting equilibria if the cost of voting is su¢ ciently low. The maximum value of voting costs that permit universal voting under the IEC is several orders of magnitude higher under the IEC versus majority rule.
Therefore, the IEC is a considerably better rule than majority rule when small shareholders and management disagree.
In a less extreme case, where institutions are not biased completely in favor of management, then some type 0 voters would vote against the proposal, making it easier to vote down. In this case, The existence of universal abstention equilibria follows the same lines. The minimum value of C=V such that a universal abstention equilibrium exists under the IEC is many orders of magnitude higher than under majority rule. That is, universal abstention, in which no small shareholders vote, requires much higher voting costs under the IEC than majority rule.
All of the above discussion has assumed that management and shareholders disagree about the quality of a proposal. If they agree, then both universal voting and universal abstention produce good outcomes: choosing a rule to induce one or the other is unnecessary. In this case, majority rule is somewhat better than the IEC, but not much.
Conclusion
I attempt in this paper to show that, with standard majority voting rules, we should not expect expanded shareholder voting to solve problems of corporate governance. There is little incentive for small shareholders to vote, because the likelihood that they a¤ect the outcome is too small to make voting worthwhile, even if they know that a proposal is harmful. I therefore argue that an alternative voting mechanism is a potential solution to the problem. Such a mechanism must signi…cantly increase the likelihood that a given shareholder's vote a¤ects the outcome of an election while simultaneously ensuring that the majority's will is usually implemented.
The Idealized Electoral College voting mechanism induces turnout, but at the cost of sometimes assigning as winner the side that receives a minority of votes. When voters of varying voting costs have similar preferences, this cost slightly exceeds the bene…t, and majority rule is a superior mechanism. When voters of varying voting costs have systematically di¤ering preferences, however, the bene…t greatly exceeds the cost and the IEC is preferable.
As applied to shareholder elections, large shareholders and management have low voting costs (per share owned) and small shareholders have high voting costs. There are arguments for and against the claim that small and large shareholders have similar preferences. On the one hand, all shareholders prefer the …rm to deliver higher dividends and capital gains. This homogeneity of shareholder preferences has, in fact, been argued to be a major factor in the rise of shareholder owned …rms in the last two hundred years (Hansmann 2000) . On the other hand, many large shareholders receive private bene…ts from management like the opportunity to lead debt or equity o¤erings, to manage pension funds, etc. Moreover, management themselves often own a large fraction of shares, and receive private bene…ts from decisions concerning mergers, executive compensation, board composition, etc. This suggests that the preferences of management/large shareholders and the majority may well di¤er. Therefore, inducing turnout via an alternative to majority rule could signi…cantly bene…t shareholders.
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3. No more than one group on the lowest tier has fewer than three voters in it. If one group has fewer than three votes then the remaining votes are assigned to either choice with probability 1/2. 22 4. If a group with fewer than three votes is present in the lowest tier (call it y) and if a group in the second lowest tier is comprised both of votes directly from voters and "votes" from groups in the lowest tier (call it w) then y is a subgroup of w.
The intuition of these rules is simple. Randomly order the votes cast and place them in a tier with N z+1 spaces, starting at the left. They will not …ll that tier, by de…nition of z. Starting at the right, move votes one by one into the next tier up, shifting the right-most remaining vote in the lowest tier to the right-most remaining space in the second lowest tier. Eventually there is no way to move votes up into an empty space, and the process is complete.
The unique fraction of votes placed in the second lowest tier, x; can then be derived:
Only in one third of cases will this value of x be such that xN is an integer (so that all voters are arranged in groups of three even though some are initially placed on the lowest tier and some on the second lowest). Let N = rd(x3 z ) where the function rd rounds the argument down to the nearest integer. Then N is the number of voters arranged into the second lowest tier. N N voters are arranged into the lowest tier. Note that in the case where N is a power of three, x = 0 or x = 1 and the rules 1-4 above are satis…ed for the mechanism as previously described. Therefore …ve votes are put into tier 0 and 11 are put into tier 0*, where tier 0 is the second lowest tier and tier 0* is the lowest. To follow rule three, the 11 votes in tier 0* are arranged into three groups of three and one group of two. To follow rule two, the three groups of three in tier 0* are collected into one super-group in tier 0. To follow rule 4, the group of two in tier 0* (plus one random vote) is added to a group in tier 0 with two other voters.
Appendix B -Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.
We then have
The power of the lowest power term in the numerator increases according to 2 i so for the numerator of (5) we have:
Turning to the denominator, because we are focusing on large values of z, we can apply Stirling's formula. The limit of
while a similar expression follows for This is an example of a two tier pyramid. There are nine voters arranged into three groups of three. In the …rst group two out of three choose A; in the second group all three choose A; in the third group two out of three choose B. Therefore the …rst and second groups "vote"for A and the third "votes"for B. Moving up to tier one, there are two "votes"for A and one for B so this tier "votes" for A. A is therefore the choice of this set of voters. Note that both voters who vote for A in the left-most group are pivotal and other voters are not. Figure 2 : This …gure displays the relative probability of a voter being pivotal under the IEC and majority mechanisms as a function of population size for four values of p 0 . As the vote is expected to be increasingly close, p 0 tends to 1 2 and the IEC rule is less powerful. As the number of voters increases, the IEC rule becomes in…nitely more powerful than the majority rule except for exactly equal choices. Figure 3 : This …gure displays the set of potential pure and mixed strategy equilibria of the game for an arbitrary monotonic voting rule. The curves represent the set of points where a vote's expected e¤ect is equal to C=V , making a voter indi¤erent between voting and abstaining. Between the curves, the expected e¤ect is greater than C=V so voters would prefer voting, and outside the curves, the expected e¤ect is less than C=V so voters would prefer to abstain. For clarity, the expected e¤ect is drawn as equal for voters of each type. Depending on the expected values of N ix , there are a variety of potential equilibria. A candidate equilibrium must lie either on a curve (so that voters are indi¤erent to voting and abstaining) or at a boundary. An equilibrium is only stable if the arrows from all feasible directions point toward the point. In this …gure, for example, A is not a pure strategy equilibrium because type C voters would prefer to vote rather than abstain, but at point A they are expected to abstain (i.e., q S = q F = 0). If E(N S ) = E(N 1 S ), then point C is an equilibrium. All voters are voting (i.e., q S = q F = 1), and all strictly prefer to vote, as shown by the arrows between the curves pointing up and to the right. Candidate equilibrium points on bold curves E and F are not stable because the up-down and left-right arrows, respectively, point away from each other. This implies that small changes in the likelihood of voting for type S and F voters, respectively, would prompt all voters of the same type to make the same change. 43 Figure 4 : The IEC increases the expected e¤ect of a vote for both types of voter, relative to majority rule, unless the expected number of voters for each side is nearly equal (in the limit, exactly equal). This means that, given a number of voters and a probability vector ! p , the curves representing = C=V for majority rule lie within those for the IEC. Inside the curves, type C voters would strictly prefer to vote. Outside the curves, they would strictly prefer to abstain. Point A is a candidate universal abstention equilibrium (i.e., q S = q F = 0). As it lies outside the curves for majority rule, it is indeed an equilibrium, as voters prefer to abstain. As it lies inside the curves for the IEC, it fails to be an equilibrium, as type C voters would prefer to vote. Similarly, the proposed universal voting equilibrium B lies outside the curves for majority rule, so it is not an equilibrium, while it lies within the curves for the IEC and therefore is an equilibrium. It is also possible for point A to lie within the curves for both mechanisms, or for point B to lie outside the curves for both. In those cases, the same type of equilibria exist for both mechanisms. For a universal voting equilibrium to lie withing the curves for majority rule and not the IEC, it must be the case that p S p F , with strict equality in the limit as N ! 1. It is not possible for the IEC to permit a universal abstention equilibrium while majority rule does not. Beginning with the left panel, in section A, when C=V < C maj , both majority rule and the IEC feature unique, universal voting equilibria. Because the IEC sometimes assigns as winner the side receiving fewer votes, majority rule is slightly better than the IEC at implementing the majority's will. In section B, where C maj < C=V < C maj , majority rule features both universal voting and universal abstention equilibria. Without an equilibrium selection rule, we cannot say whether majority rule or the IEC is superior, but because the IEC almost always selects the winner according to the majority's preferences, and majority rule may induce universal abstention, we can say that the IEC is at least a safer bet. In section C, where C maj < C=V < C IEC , The IEC is clearly better, as it induces universal voting rather than universal abstention. In section D, where C IEC < C=V < C IEC , the IEC supports both universal voting and universal abstention equilibria. Either one, however, is better than the unique universal abstention equilibrium associated with majority rule, which is assured to make the choice less preferred by the majority. In section E, where C IEC < C=V , the IEC is slightly better because it chooses the majority-preferred choice at least sometimes. In the right panel, the di¤erence is that, rather than each mechanism sometimes supporting both types of equilibrium, they both sometimes support no stable equilibrium. Sections A, C, and E have identical properties as in the left hand panel. In section B, where C maj < C=V < C maj , majority rule does not allow a stable equilibrium. As the IEC almost always implements the will of the majority, it is clearly superior. In section D, where C IEC < C=V < C IEC , the IEC does not allow a stable equilibrium. However, as majority rule certainly does not implement the majority's will for these values of C=V , any outcome induced by the IEC must be weakly better. Figure 6 : These panels display whether one or both types of equilibrium exist for each mechanism, as we vary the expected di¤erence in voter preferences. In each case, N and C=V are …xed. Spaces labeled "A" support only universal abstention equilibria. The vote share of type 0 voters is expected to be so lopsided that it is not worthwhile for any type C voter to vote. Spaces labeled "B" support only universal voting equilibria. The vote is expected to be close enough if everybody votes that it is worth it for each voter to vote. Spaces labeled "C"support both types of equilibrium. While the vote is expected to be close enough if everybody votes that it is worth it for each voter to vote, the vote is also expected to be so lopsided if only type 0 voters vote that, if type C voters expect that to occur, they will not vote. Spaces labeled "D"do not support stable equilibria. The vote is close enough if only type 0 voters vote that type C voters will prefer to vote. However, if all of them do so, then the vote is lopsided enough that it is no longer worth them voting. Note that area B is larger for the IEC than majority rule. In fact, it may be millions or billions of times as large for any reasonable number of voters. Also, area A is smaller for the IEC. Note that as C=V or N rise, area B would shrink in each …gure, with the left-and right-most borders approaching the center. Area B would be eliminated for the IEC before majority rule because majority rule o¤ers voters slightly more power if p S = p F . ), the IEC rule with = 3 o¤ers voters greater power relative to the IEC rule with = 9. As the number of voters increases, the IEC rule with = 3 o¤ers in…nitely more power than with = 9. 
